During the height of the Cold War, there was little ambiguity about the nature and designs of the dominant authoritarian states. The current environment presents a murkier picture. Modern authoritarian governments are integrated into the global economy and participate in many of the world’s established financial and political institutions. And while they tolerate little pluralism at home, they often call for a “multipolar” world in which their respective ideologies can coexist peacefully with others.

The lack of clarity about the nature of these regimes has resulted in a similarly uncertain response from the community of democratic states. Optimistic observers have pinned their hopes on engagement, arguing that interlocking relationships could encourage undemocratic partners to adopt basic democratic standards, or that market-oriented trade and development will inevitably lead to political liberalization. However, leading authoritarian regimes are already well-practiced in the art of allowing economic activity while protecting their political prerogatives, and they are vigorously advancing their own, illiberal values. It is not obvious why they would abandon this approach when dealing with foreign governments.

In fact, as the world’s democracies have struggled to find a common approach to the problem, or even to agree that there is a problem, modern authoritarian states have worked diligently to spread their influence through an extensive web of media concerns, publicrelations consultants, diplomatic initiatives, and nontransparent aid packages. Meanwhile, their efforts to disrupt international forums like the United Nations, the OAS, and the OSCE could cripple the ability of established democracies to coordinate their policies and encourage democratic development in other countries. Just as they rule without law within their borders, authoritarian regimes are eroding the international rules and standards built up by the democratic world over the past several decades, threatening to export the instability and abuses that their systems engender.

In a 21st-century context, isolation of or disengagement from these authoritarian states are not viable options. And generally speaking, in order to advance economic interests, these regimes would prefer engagement with the United States and its allies, but only on their terms. An agenda focused selectively on economic or security matters would suit Beijing and Moscow quite well, and this is the type of relationship they have been working toward.

However, if the world’s democracies buy in to this restrictive approach, they fall into the authoritarians’ trap. The strength and competitive advantage of democratic states lie in their rules-based, accountable, and open systems, and in the values and standards that support them. By extension, an international system that is grounded in human rights and the rule of law is far more desirable than the opaque and capricious alternative being actively pursued by the regimes examined in this study. It is therefore in the democracies’ interest to safeguard and promote the very qualities that set them apart from the authoritarians.

Curiously enough, all of the regimes in question routinely invoke the term democracy to make their case at home and abroad. It is a testament to the value and power of this idea that those who systematically undermine it seek shelter in its name. But democracy faces a dark future if such attempts to eviscerate the term itself go unchallenged.